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Abstract
This paper considers what we argue was the first experiment of an exchange
rate band. This experiment took place in Austria-Hungary between 1896 and
1914. The rationale for introducing this policy rested on precisely those
intuitions that modern target zone literature has recently emphasized: the
band was designed to secure both exchange rate stability and monetary
policy autonomy. However, unlike more recent experiences, such as the
ERM, this policy was not undermined by credibility problems. In other words
the episode provides us with an ideal testing ground for some important
ideas in modern macroeconomics: specifically, can formal rules, when
faithfully adhered to, provide policy makers with some advantages such as
short term flexibility? First, we find that a credible band has a
“microeconomic” influence on exchange rate stability. By reducing
uncertainty, a credible fluctuation band improves the quality of expectations,
a channel that has been neglected in the modern literature. Second, we
show that the standard test of the basic target zone model is flawed and
develop an alternative methodology. This enables us to understand why
Austro-Hungarian policy makers were so upbeat about the merits of
exchange rate target zones. We believe that these findings shed a new light
on the economics of exchange rate bands.
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2Introduction
Economic concepts are supposedly like modern Athenas, we often think of them as being born
fully mature and armed. Economists generally pay insufficient attention to the archeology of ideas.
These are, nonetheless, significant not only in and of themselves, but also insofar as they often shed
important insights on our current understanding of policy issues (Blaug 2001). We consider here an
early experiment with an exchange-rate band implemented in 1896 in the Austria-Hungary before
World War I, and which lasted until WWI. This experience is relevant for our understanding of the
impact of exchange-rate arrangements on monetary policy. The reason is, that the Austro-Hungarian
exchange-rate regime was explicitly designed as an early version of what has become known as a
target zone, and that unlike more recent attempts it was extremely successful. This policy was
described by one of its main architects, Count Bilinski, who was then governor of the Bank, as
original, excellent, and very useful in insulating the currency from foreign shocks, while also
providing for exchange rate stability. According to Bilinski, this innovation in monetary policy
had enhanced the banks reputation greatly, and brought it prestige not only in the financial markets
but within academia (Federn, 1911, 1388). Leading contemporary economists, such as Knapp
[1905], saw these policies as the archetypal application of the new theories in vogue at the time,
according to which a currency derives its value of what market thought of the issuing government 
in modern language, of its credibility. This, they argued, opened the way to the emergence of active
monetary management, of which the Austro-Hungarian monetary authorities were described as a
pioneer.
For contemporary macroeconomists these views have a definitely modern ring. They echoe
Krugmans model of an exchange-rate band (Krugman 1991) which is a formal description of how a
fluctuation band (target zone) works in theory. The models fundamental insight is that, compared
to free floats, target zones are «inherently stabilizing»: as the exchange rate approaches one of the
bounds, its responsiveness to monetary shocks declines, for agents anticipate the counteracting
effect of eventual foreign exchange interventions by the central banks. Subsequently, Svensson
[1992, 1994] emphasized that the main advantage of such a system was that it enables monetary
authorities to refrain from tightening monetary policy when foreign interest rates increase without
suffering excessive exchange rate depreciation (and vice versa), because agents expect an eventual
3stabilization of the currency. The central bank gets a measure of insulation when domestic and
foreign conditions differ  just as Austro-Hungarian monetary authorities thought.
Svensson attributed the origin of this notion to Keynes [1931] who argued, in a now famous part
of his Treatise on Money that there was a correspondence between the distance within the «gold
points» (as exchange rate bands were known under the gold standard) and the degree of short-term
policy autonomy1. Yet, as Einzig [1937] recognized,  Keynes insight itself had its roots in the
policies of the central bank of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. These policies had emerged as a
response to the dilemma of trying to find some way to secure exchange rate quasi-fixity, while also
getting the kind of protection from foreign exchange-rate shocks that was thought to have existed in
the past behind the Chinese wall of flexible exchange rates (Lotz [1889]). In particular, Austro-
Hungarian authorities wanted to avoid excessive increases in the discount rate, which would have
obtained perforce, it was thought, under a strict gold standard, with adverse impact on the real side
of the domestic economy (Knapp, 1909, 250; Mises 1909b). Moreover, discount rate changes were a
potential source of conflict between the Austrian and the Hungarian parts of the Monarchy and their
occurrence was to be minimized.2
The practical solution found to this problem was to stabilize the currency from 1896 onwards
within an informal currency band whose exact size authorities never specified. Observers put it
around +/-0.4%, a figure that more or less corresponded to the shipping charges for bullion between
Vienna and leading financial centers such as Berlin or London. Austria-Hungary was, thus, said to
shadow the gold standard. This was achieved through discretionary foreign exchange intervention
when the exchange rate departed too much from the central parity, rather than through gold
convertibility, as some other central banks of the time did.3 In effect, compulsory convertibility,
although constantly on the mind of subsequent finance ministers was never introduced.
Contemporary authors, such as Walther Federn (a practicing economist and founding editor
(1909) of the Viennese financial weekly, Der Österreichische Volskwirt), explained how stability
and flexibility were mutually reinforcing in strikingly modern terms, that anticipate recent analyses
(Federn, 1910b, 662; Federn, 1911, 1391; Federn, 1912).4 When interest rates were higher in Berlin
than in Vienna, the bank could let the exchange rate depreciate as a substitute to raising the interest
rate. The resulting exchange rate depreciation needed not have been large, because it triggered
stabilizing expectations of eventual recovery: the [resulting depreciation] in the exchange rate
remains relatively small, because the excess demand for foreign exchange [in Vienna] disappears by
itself, insofar as the small expected increase in utility to be gained through interest rate arbitrage is
4compensated by the risks of losses due to [the threat of a future recovery] in the exchange rate.5 As
a consequence, the Austro-Hungarian economy was not completely hostage to tight monetary
policies in distant parts of the globe (table 1).6
Table 1. Frequency of official discount rate changes
Country Number of Official
Discount Rate Changes
Average Number of
Changes per Annum
United Kingdom 221 6.70
Germany 136 4.12
Austria-Hungary 50 1.32
1876-1895 23 1.5
1896-1913 27 1.5
Source: Celli [1998] from Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik, Reichsbank, 1925.
While virtually forgotten today, this precedent is well known to inter-war economists. Einzigs
famous book, The Theory of forward exchange (1937) (not incidentally dedicated to Keynes),
accepts Federns views without reservations,: To discourage the outflow of funds, Einzig wrote
the Austro-Hungarian Bank at times allowed the [florin] to depreciate [] Since the stability of the
[florin] was above suspicion [] few people cared to run the risk of losses through its probable
recovery, simply for the sake of an arbitrage profit which, for a period of three months, was never
much over 1/2 per cent. Moreover, Einzig suggested explicitly that there was a clear parallel
between Austro-Hungarian policies and Keynes intuitions: The device of allowing the spot
exchange to depreciate [] closely resembles Mr. Keyness proposal for the widening of the margin
between gold points. And the circumstances of its application in 1907 and on other occasions are
very similar to those in which Mr. Keynes claims that his proposed measures would be beneficial,
i.e. when the weakness of the currency is due, not to fundamental disequilibria or a sweeping wave
of distrust, but solely to the situation in foreign financial markets (Einzig 1937, 332-3).7
Thus, the Austro-Hungarian precedent was the first experiment with an exchange-rate target
zone, designed according to modern principles. Unlike its modern counterparts, however, it was
one that observers deemed successful. We argue that studying it illuminates current discussions of
the issue. We show that while the 1990s debate over target zones provided a useful analytical
framework, it also confounded the matter somewhat by focusing almost exclusively on Europes
ERM. The ERM lacked credibility and its students concluded that the possibility of a trade-off
between exchange rate stability and monetary policy autonomy rested solely on the monetary
5authorities ability to establish credibility. The findings of this paper suggest, in contrast, that this
widely-held conclusion is incomplete. On the basis of newly collected (forward and spot) foreign
exchange and interest rate series we carefully gauge the various hypotheses that are at the heart of
the modern target zone model. This leads us to identify a new microeconomic channel which has
been neglected in the modern literature: in particular, we show that the introduction of a target zone
may change the very quality of expectations. This channel, through which target zones can further
be stabilizing, and which does open the way to the policies described in theory Keynes-Krugman-
Svensson and applied in practice in Austria-Hungary has been neglected in the recent literature.
Moreover, we show that the existence of arbitrage costs render the standard test of the target-zone
model basically inappropriate: dues to the existence of transaction costs that play a large role over
the short term horizon of monetary management,  it is insufficient to consider whether there is a
negative correlation between interest rates differentials and the spread between the exchange rate
and parity. To tackle this problem, we develop and alternative methodology, that sheds light on the
root of Austro-Hungarian policy successes, and could in effect be used to study any modern
experience.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section I reviews the building blocks of TZ
theory. Section II describes the workings of pre-1914 Viennese exchange markets and analyses their
efficiency with and without a band. Section III explores Covered Interest Parity in order to
document arbitrage efficiency and provides a new methodology to assess the performance of a given
target zone. We conclude with lessons for both economic theory and economic policy.
Section I. Does credibility “buy” autonomy? Some theory and a puzzle
a) Theory
Modern TZ theory posits, first that fundamentals (money supplies) determine exchange rates so
that exchange rates can be monitored through interventions on fundamentals (non sterilized foreign
exchange interventions that adjust money supplies when needed). Second, it presumes that markets
are efficient, from which follows that in the absence of arbitrage costs, interest differentials between
countries are proportional to the spread between spot and forward rates (known as the forward
premium) and that the forward premium is an unbiased predictor of actual exchange rate changes.
From these two axioms follows a key prediction: interest rate differentials should be inversely
related to location of the exchange rate within the band. The intuition is that since the exchange rate
is bounded above and below (because of interventions), the likelihood of continued exchange rate
6appreciation, when the currency is strong, is low, and so is the likelihood of continued exchange rate
depreciation when the exchange rate is weak. In other words, a measure of mean reversion is built
into such a bounded process and rational agents should realize it: as a result, they should accept a
lower interest rate for a currency that is momentarily weaker, (because of expected gains on its
future appreciation), thereby giving the monetary authorities the flexibility of not intervening in the
spot foreign-exchange market without using interest-rate increases as an adjustment tool (Figure 1).
Figure 1. The basic TZ model: Predicted relation between the Exchange Rate and the Interest Rate
differential
2) Empirical Evidence
Research on contemporary experiences have basically rejected this model (see Svensson [1992]
for an early survey). Essentially, the focus on the recent ERM experience, and more specifically on
the Franc-Mark relationship led to the conclusion that whenever the exchange rate depreciates
towards the edge of the band, the interest rate of the weaker currency rises above that of the stronger
one. Thus, exchange rate depreciation has been associated with higher, not lower, domestic interest
rates, in sharp contrast to the models predictions. However, this was because in the ERM a
7depreciation towards the edge of the band was interpreted as a signal that a devaluation could be
anticipated. Therefore, a consensus emerged that the ERM must have lacked the crucial ingredient
of credibility.
More recently, however, a number of papers provided a partial rescue of the target-zone model,
and reinforced at the same time the notion that the ERM lacked credibility. The examination of the
record of the stronger members of the classical and inter-war gold standards, whose policies
involved much less frequent devaluations resulted in more encouraging assessment of TZ regimes
(Bordo and MacDonald [1997], Hallwood, MacDonald, and Marsch [1998], Bordo and MacDonald,
[1999], Hallwood, MacDonald and Marsch [1998]). Yet, the substitutability between exchange rate
stability and policy autonomy remained rather modest. For example, Bordo and MacDonalds
[1999] tests on the relationship between exchange rates and interest rate differentials before WWI
only found two out of the three relations under study in agreement with the theory: while UK-
Germany and UK-France, yield a negative relation between interest differentials and exchange rates
the slope is positive for France-Germany. Moreover, as is apparent in Figure 2a, this relation, even
when correctly signed, is not significant. A similar chart drawn for Austria-Hungary and Germany
for 1896-1914 does not seem to give a more convincing picture.
8Figure 2 a. Franc/Pound, 1880-1914:
Market Interest Rate Spread (%) in Terms of Percentage Deviation from Gold Parity
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9Figure 2b. Florin/Mark 1896:4-1914:
Market Interest Rate Spread (%) in Terms of Percentage Deviation from Gold Parity
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From these exercises, it is hard to conclude without doubts that earlier bands provided enough of
the much desired policy autonomy, despite all the efforts that contemporaries made to secure
credibility. Could the lesson be that even in the best-case scenario, the trade-off remains so modest
and unreliable? Even the more favorable results one obtains with data from the gold standard era
could be interpreted as devastating evidence against the target zone model. Why, then, were
contemporaries so impressed with the operation of the Habsburg target zone? Or is it, as we shall
argue in this paper, that the story is just more subtle than has been acknowledged so far, that the
standard way the basic model has been tested is flawed, and that a more careful discussion of the
empirics of target zones is in order?
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Section II Foreign exchange market efficiency
a) Early forward markets
Unlike for other pre-1914 exchange rate regimes studied recently, Austria-Hungary had a well-
developed market for forward exchange. The data required to document each of the hypotheses at
the heart of the TZ model  covered and uncovered interest parity  are, thus, available. Before we
proceed, however, a brief discussion of Viennas foreign exchange market is in order.
Futures in foreign exchange facilitate transactions in goods and securities across the borders if at
least one of the countries has fluctuating exchange rates. Thus, there were less reasons for futures to
develop among the German reichsmark, the French franc, or the British pound, because all were on
essentially fixed exchange rates even prior to the advent of the gold standard. However, among the
mark, on the one hand, and such currencies as Austria-Hungarys florin and the Russian ruble this
need did arise, insofar as Germany was both Russias and Austria-Hungarys most important
trading, and perhaps financial, partner, with both the florin and the ruble effectively on a flexible
exchange rate until the 1890s. Fluctuations of the florin-reichsmark exchange rate before 1896 were
very large (Figure 3). In order to cover merchants risks, as well as risks associated with arbitrage on
securities denominated in foreign currencies, large markets in currency futures evolved in Central
Europe in the last third of the nineteenth century with traders specializing in the business8 (Lotz,
1889, 1279). Gulden-mark futures came into being, probably well before 1876 when published data
first appeared (Einzig, 1937, 31-38).9 Most importantly, the forward market survived the
stabilization of the florin in the 1890s (see appendix for the construction of the data set).
11
Figure 3. The Florin/Mark Exchange Rate. Florins / 100 Marks, 1870-1914
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A well known feature of forward rates is that they track sport rates rather closely (MacDonald
[1989]): not much insight can be gained by plotting both series. By contrast, looking at the volatility
of exchange rates and forward rates is informative. Figure 4 compares the volatility of the forward
premium and that of actual exchange rate changes. This may be thought of, in first approximation,
as a way to compare the volatility of predicted versus actual changes. The chart suggests that the
stabilization of the florin after 1896 went along with a considerable reduction of the volatility of
spot rates both in absolute terms and in relation to the volatility of the forward premium: one
interpretation is that the transition to the florins currency band implied much less uncertainty
regarding future exchange rate changes, improving the information ratio between spot and forward
exchange. In the next paragraph, we test this formally, and show that the adoption of the florin
target zone also brought about a much greater predictability of future exchange rate changes.
12
Figure 4. Root of Average Squared Forward Premium and Exchange Rate Changes
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Volatility measure: actual exchange rate  changes
Volatility measure: expected exchange rate changes
b) Testing for market efficiency.
The efficiency of 19th-century forward markets has remained virtually unexplored  perhaps
because they were so few in number and the pertinent data are not readily available.10 We proceed
to test the efficiency of the florin/mark market before and after the stabilization of the florin. The
approach we adopt follows a well established tradition (Fama [1984]). If markets are efficient, the
forward premium should be an unbiased predictor of actual exchange rate changes:
st+1−st=α+β ft−st( )+ν t+1
where νt is a random shock, st is the log spot rate at month t and ft the log forward rate quoted at
month t for delivery at t+1.11 Efficiency in the forward market implies β = 1. (The constant α
measures the risk premium and is zero if investors are risk neutral). We split the period under study
in a number of sub periods in order to account for a possible regime change as suggested earlier.
The entire sample spans 1876:11 to 1914:7.12 Within the two main "epochs (floating exchange
rates before 1896 and currency band hereafter) we consider a number of sub periods motivated by
policy/institutional change as follows:
• The period of floating exchange rate is 1876:11 to 1896:3.
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The period of the float can be divided into three sub-periods: 1876:11 to 1889:7 before
stabilization became a serious option; 1889:8 to 1892:4 during which stabilization was discussed
but not decided;13 and 1892:5 to 1896:3 when the basis of the stabilization was decided but not
yet implemented.14
• The « target zone » period spans 1896:4 to 1914:6.15
We distinguish 1896:4 to 1901:7 from the rest of the period. Until 1901:8, the stabilization of the
currency remained a unilateral Bank policy. While consistent with the laws of 1892 and 1893,
this policy had been applied without official endorsement from the finance ministers. In addition
the charter of the bank were due to expire in 1897 and this cast a shadow on the continuation of
its policies. In 1899, after drawn-out discussions and provisory renewals, the Banks charter was
finally extended. This paved the way for the replacement of the florin in 1900 by a new unit of
account (crown=0.5 florin). New gold florins were coined and put in circulation and in August
1901 the bank began paying in new gold coins (albeit it was not legally committed to doing so).
This decision, after a somewhat extended transition period, opened what is customarily described
as the heyday of the florin currency band that lasted about 13 years until WWI (Von Mises,
[1909], p. 203).
The results point to a sharp contrast in the performance of the markets during the period of the
float and the period of target zone, especially after 1901 (Table 2). Strictly speaking market
efficiency is not inconsistent with the data for the period before 1901 but this comes from the low
explanatory power of the equation under scrutiny: low t-statistics, occasionally negative estimated
βs, negligible adjusted R2, and F tests generally point towards low market efficiency or outright
inefficiency before the currency was stabilized.16 After the interregnum of 1896-1901, however, the
golden age of the florin target zone provides support to the strongest form of the efficient market
hypothesis (Table 2, Row 5).17 Individual parameter estimates are found very near to the values
implied by the EMH (α=0 and β=.99), significance increases dramatically, adjusted R2 rise
substantially, and the F-test leads us to accept unambiguously the null of market efficiency.18 The
conclusion is that the stabilization of the florin after the turn of the century produced a considerable
improvement in the efficiency of the foreign exchange market. Not only did variations of the
forward rate became smaller, but they also became easier to predict.19
14
Table 2. Foreign Exchange Market Efficiency Tests : st+1−st=α+β ft−st( )+ν t+1
Period α β Adj.R2 DW F test
1) 1876:12 - 1889:7
N= 152 (a)
-0.000
(-.144)
1.47
(1.45)
.01 2.0 F(2,150)=0.13
(*)
2) 1889 :8 - 1892 :4
N= 33
-.001
(-.43)
1.42
(.68)
-.02 1.9 F(2,31)=0.096
(*)
3) 1892 :5 - 1896 :3
N=47
.001
(1.4)
-1.13
(-1.63)
.03 1.8 F(2,45)=5.04
3) 1876 :12 - 1896 :3
N=232 (a)
-0.26 10-3
(-0.42)
0.54
(0.89)
-0.8 10-3 1.99 F(2,230)=0.46
(*)
4) 1896 :4 to 1901 :7
N= 64
-.000
(-.52)
.10
(.32)
-.01 2.3 F(2,219)=3.52
5) 1901 :8 to 1914 : 8
N= 157
.000
(.15)
.99
(5.23)
.14 2.0 F(2, 155)=0.01
(*)
Source: authors computations: see text. T-stats in parentheses (a) based on average" series, due to data
limitations. When average and Geld series coexist, they yield virtually identical results.
(*) null that α= 0 and β=1 accepted at 5%.
c) Efficiency and mean reversion
The previous conclusion has far-reaching consequences for the relation between spot rates and
the implicit rate of exchange rate changes one can derive from the forward premium: efficiency in a
forward market when the underlying exchange rate is kept in a band (and thus mean reverting)
should translate into a negative relationship between the location of the exchange rate within the
band and the expected rate of depreciation. We offer two pieces of evidence to document that this
was, indeed, the case.
First, an obviously negative relationship exists between the forward premium and the exchange
rate during the period of the TZ exchange-rate regime, and it becomes even clearer to the golden
age after 1901. This relation looks exactly as predicted by target zone models: it slopes downward.
This is important because it shows that the credibility of the florin and the efficiency of the Vienna
market for forward exchange improved at the very same time. This was far from being the case
during the flexible exchange-rate regime (Figure 5b). The transition to the florin band thus induced
fundamental transformations not only in the opinion market participants had of the florin, but
plainly in the process through which this opinion was generated. In other words, the stabilization
brought by a currency band might only partly come from stabilizing expectations regarding future
interventions as suggested by the Keynes-Krugman-Svensson tradition: a currency band creates an
environment that changes the very quality of expectations.
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Figure 5.a Annualized expected exchange rate change (%)
in terms of exchange rate deviation from parity (%) (1901:8-1914:8)
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Figure 5.b. Annualized expected exchange rate change (%)in terms of exchange rate deviation
from parity (%) (1889:7-1896:3)
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Second, we can see that the TZ band played a particularly important role at times of international
financial crisis such as that of 1907, which originated in the US and reverberated quickly in major
16
financial centers such as London and Berlin. The ability of the Habsburg monetary authorities to
maintain a lower discount rate than the one prevailing in Berlin throughout the crisis, in spite of
considerable pressure on the crown was widely described at the time as a masterpiece of monetary
management and a direct consequence of the existing band (Federn 1909). Figure 6, derived from
daily data, shows why contemporaries were enthusiastic. As can be seen the forward rate was
systematically above the spot rate when the spot rate was below parity and vice versa. As the crisis
developed, we see that the exchange rate depreciated while expectations of a future re-appreciation
of the Habsburg currency began to feed in. And one implication of this was a widening of the spread
between bank rates shown in the lower part of the chart. Clearly, in periods of crises as well as
during normal times (as captured by our efficiency regressions), market participants expected
exchange rates to return towards parity. Increased efficiency for a credible system did imply that
market participants systematically expected the exchange rate to appreciate when it was low and to
depreciate when it was high, on which the Austro-Hungarian monetary authorities could depend.
Figure 6. The crisis of 1907:
exchange rates and official interest rates
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Section III. Covered interest parity: the integration of money markets and foreign
exchange markets
At this stage, one might conclude that by the Summer of 1901, the florins band had so much
improved market efficiency that Austro-Hungarian monetary authorities could obtain some short-
term interest rate autonomy, letting the exchange rate adjust. Why, then, is it that we find the pattern
in Figure 2.b, whereby the apparent trade-off is far from obvious? Answering that question requires
carefully documenting covered interest parity.
a) Covered interest parity, a cursory look
Formally the condition that needs to be tested (recalling that interest rates are given as percentage
per annum while forward rates are one month ahead contracts) reads20:
st+1−st=α+β ft−st( )+ν t+1 (2)
There were two interest rates in use at the time: the open market rate21 and the official bank
rate.22 Insofar as they both have relative merits, we shall consider them in turn in our covered
interest parity tests.23 Figure 7a and b provide a crude test of equation 2, relying on market and
official rate differentials. The charts suggest that it was only after 1895 that the resemblance
between expected depreciation and interest differentials improved. But even then the similarity was
not perfect, regardless of the measure we use. Clearly, one cannot take covered interest parity for
granted, which explains why the link between exchange rates and interest rate differentials is loser
than the one between exchange rates and expected exchange-rate changes.
18
Figure 7a. Covered interest parity (annualized expected x-rate change in terms of interest
differential): market rates
(units: percentage. Blue: 1876-1895. Pink: 1896-1914)
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Figure 7b. Covered interest parity: bank rates
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b) Covered interest parity, 2: a naïve test
To go beyond the previous exercise, a popular test of CIP (MacDonald [1986]) is to run:
ft−st( )⋅1200=α+β⋅ it−it*( )+ε t                (3)
where the null that (2) is true is accepted if one cannot reject α=0 and β=1. The results of this test
are reported in table 3. Once again the results indicate that a transformation occurred around 1896,
as evidenced by the improved fit of the model after 1896. At the same time, these tests lead to
reject the assumption of covered interest parity for all sub periods. On the surface, the integration of
money and foreign exchange markets does not seem to have been perfect.
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Table 3. Integration of money and FX markets: Tests of ft−st( )⋅1200=α+β⋅ it−it*( )+ε t
Period α β Adj.R2 DW F test
MARKET RATES DIFFERENTIALS
1876 :11-1914 :8 -0,15
(-2,72)
0,52
(10,63)
0,17 1,60 F(2,414)=102,35
1876 :11-1896 :3 -0,26
(-2,38)
0,55
(6,25)
0,14 1,68 F(2, 193)=54,08
1896 :4-1914-8 -0,08
(-2,03)
0,58
(9,76)
0,30 1,36 F(2,219)=51,14
BANK RATES DIFFERENTIALS
1876 :11-1896 :3 0,15
(3,61)
0,50
(8,25)
0,12 1,48 F(2,414)=5,84
1876 :11-1896 :3 0,04
(0,56)
0,60
(5,21)
0,10 1,55 F(2,193)=6,47
1896 :4-1914-8 0,24
(6,25)
0,50
(8,88)
0,26 1,28 F(2,219)=78,60
Source: authors computations: see text. T-stats in parentheses. Results with Viennas minimum market rate.
c) Covered interest parity: within the neutral band
i) A test from first principles
This last conclusion however, should be qualified. The rationale for equation (2) rests on an
arbitrage relation. But arbitrage entails costs. This motivates an alternative strategy that compares
actual deviations from interest parity to arbitrage costs. Estimating arbitrage costs is difficult. It
requires a knowledge of the operation of foreign exchange and money markets. This has often led
modern researchers to use indirect routes (Frenkel and Levich [1975], MacDonald [1986]).
In our case, however, a direct measure can be obtained. Consider, as do Federn [1910] and
Einzig [1937], a banker who seeks to take advantage of interest rate discrepancies between Berlin
and Vienna. He has access to both money markets where he can lend or borrow at the prevailing
open market rate.24 If (2) does not hold, for instance, when the Berlin rate is too high, a covered
arbitrage is feasible (a symmetrical reasoning holds if the rate in Vienna is too high). This involves
borrowing florins for one month in Vienna, selling the proceeds against marks on the spot market,
then lending in Berlin for one month while covering the operation through a forward contract. 25 For
this operation, it is the market rate, not the bank rate, which is relevant, motivating our subsequent
focus.26
The expenses involved in the arbitrage are straightforward: the operation implies one spot
purchase and one forward sale. Thus, the banker ends up paying the bid-ask spread (he is a seller in
one transaction and a purchaser in the other one). This amounted, for both spot and forward
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transactions to about 0.1 florin while the exchange rate fluctuated around 60 fl., or an interest loss of
about 2% per annum (200 basis points). Formally: arbitrage should produce:
( ) ( )*2% 1200 2%t t t tf s i i− ≤ − ⋅ − − ≤ + (4)
Consistent with this argument, figure 8 depicts the deviations from covered interest parity
(implicit rate of depreciation minus interest rate differential) and compares them to the neutral
band. As seen, violations were fairly frequent before 1896. They virtually disappeared, but for one
exception, thereafter. Moreover, the deviations were found after that date in a much narrower range
than the neutral band suggesting that there were some other forces, on top of covered arbitrage, that
prevented discrepancies for growing too large, a point to which we return below. From this
respect, integration of the money and foreign exchange markets prevailed by and large throughout
the entire period under study and probably improved after 1896.
But the important conclusion here is that the apparently weak relationship in Figure 2.b can be
understood as the natural consequence of arbitrage costs. The intuition is nothing else than the
familiar principle of Tobin taxes: transaction costs on interest rate arbitrage have dramatic effects
over short horizons. But this short term horizon is precisely the one over which the target zone can
bring autonomy. In the end, the economics of Tobin taxes and those of target zones interfere with
each other causing the relationship to be blurred in Figure 2.b. But this should not be interpreted so
as to imply that autonomy disappeared entirely. Only it was concealed behind a veil of arbitrage
expenses.
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Figure 8 : Spreads of Spreads:
Expected depreciation minus interest differential and arbitrage costs
(1876:11-1914:8)
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ii) Was there a dynamic causality structure?
The finding that deviations from CIP were on average small and non-persistent (Figure 8)
implies that there was a mechanism that drove the interest rate differential towards the expected rate
of depreciation or vice versa. Theory is a guide to determine the direction of causation: the basic
principle on which rests the conduct of monetary policy in a target zone, is to use market
expectations as a substitute for interest rate changes. In other words, when German interest rates
soared, Austro-Hungarian authorities should have been able not to follow suit (as was the case in
1907). Instead, they could let the spot exchange rate fall and/or the forward rate rise in order to
increase the forward premium.
Thus, one would expect interest differentials to be the exogenous variable, while the expected
exchange-rate changes  are endogenous and react with a lag to changes in the interest differential.
This is the hypothesis we proceed to test using a two dimensional VAR model that involves both
terms of the covered interest parity equation. Formally we have:
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− = + + + + − + − + +
(5)
where ( ) 1200t t tf sϕ = − ⋅  is the expected rate of exchange-rate change, and υi (i=1,2) are random
shocks. Results are presented in Table 4.a and b. The lag structure, VAR(4), was selected using
optimizing procedures (conclusions are unaffected to the number of lags selected). Estimates are
revealing. First, interest differentials are fairly persistent (much more than expected rates of
depreciation). Using market interest rates we see that none of the coefficients of the lagged values of
the other variable (bold-faced) is significant for the period of the float prior to 1896 (Table 4a,
columns 1 and 2). This is also the case using bank rates (Table 4.b, columns 1 and 2). These are
important results, because they imply that the forward premium was not a good predictor of the
interest rate differential and the interest rate differential between Vienna and Berlin, in turn, was not
a good predictor of the forward premium. The Granger causality values reflect this by being small
and insignificant.27
Second, we observe a clear change in the causality structure when we compare the period before
1896 to the period after. After 1896, an obvious one-way causality goes from the interest rate
differential to the expected rate of depreciation, regardless of the interest differential we focus on.
The Granger causality coefficient is large and significant only in column 3.28 This shows that once
the band was adopted a widening in the Vienna-Berlin interest rate spread, instead of leading to an
automatic correction (with say, Austro-Hungarian rates tracking German rates) generated in the next
few weeks a widening of the forward premium. Moreover, the estimated dynamic structure for
bank-rates differentials (column 2 and 4 Tables 4a and 4b), are virtually identical before and after
1896, except that during the float, bank rates tended to be higher in Vienna than in Berlin, whereas
during the TZ period it was the other way around. In other words, despite the transition to a fixed
exchange rate regime Austro-Hungarian monetary authorities had been able to change their discount
rate as infrequently in response to foreign shocks as they did prior to 1896. The stabilization of the
currency within a band had thus succeeded in not jeopardizing the precious leeway that flexible
exchange rates provided in the past.
Clearly, despite having stabilized their currency within a narrow band, authorities could use the
exchange rate as a substitute to interest rate hikes. In other words, the relation between exchange
rate and interest rate differentials that is at the heart of target zones was only concealed behind
transaction costs. Underneath that crust, forward premia and interest differentials interacted in a way
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that enabled Habsburg monetary authorities to run the florin target zones along the lines of a
textbook that was not yet written.
Table 4.a. Dynamic causality within the neutral band: market rates
1876-1896 1896-1914
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. ϕ i-i* ϕ i-i*
ϕ (-1) 0,058
(0,87)
0,05
(1,75)
0.30
(4.21)
-0.13 10-2
(-0.02)
ϕ (-2) 0,23
(3,62)
-0,017
(-0,54)
0.06
(0.85)
0.03
(0.46)
ϕ (-3) 0,16
(1,65)
0,034
(1,03)
0.19
(2.58)
-0.06
(-0.85)
ϕ (-4) 0,19
(3,00)
0,031
(0,94)
-0.08
(-1.14)
-0.02
(-0.30)
i-i*(-1) 0,17
(1,33)
0,57
(8,56)
0.41
(5.30)
0.57
(7.70)
i-i*(-2) -0,01
(0,06)
0,13
(1,77)
-0.20
(-2.26)
-0.06
(-0.78)
i-i*(-3) 0,11
(0,07)
0,17
(2,30)
0.09
(1.04)
0.23
(2.76)
i-i*(-4) 0,06
(0,50)
-0,13
(-1,9)
-0.09
(-1.12)
-0.08
(-1.09)
Constant -0,10
(-0,90)
0,19
(3,46)
-0.02
(-0.36)
0.14
(3.17)
Nobs 229 221
Adj-R2 0.27 0.67 0.36 0.35
Granger causal. 1.36 1,91 7.37 (*) 0.27
Schwartz BIC -0.89 -2.61
Periods are 1896:11 to 1896:3 and 1896:3 to 1914:8.
(*) significant at 5%
T statistics in parenthesis  the coefficients of the lagged values of the other variable are bold faced. Time units are
monthly observations.
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Table 4.b. Dynamic causality within the neutral band: bank rates
1876-1896 1896-1914
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ϕ i-i* ϕ i-i*
ϕ (-1) 0,07
(1,16)
0,02
(0,78)
0.34
(4.82)
0.03
(0.60)
ϕ (-2) 0,25
(3,94)
0,02
(0,83)
0.02
(0.27)
-0.05
(-0.88)
ϕ (-3) 0,12
(1,96)
0,03
(1,06)
0.24
(3.34)
0.85 10-2
(0.14)
ϕ (-4) 0,21
(3,31)
-0,006
(-0,25)
-0.07
(-0.96)
0.40 10-2
(0.07)
i-i*(-1) 0,17
(1,08)
0,76
(11,12)
0.38
(4.23)
0.78
(10.81)
i-i*(-2) 0,04
(0,19)
-0,02
(-0,31)
-0.21
(-1.87)
0.04
(0.52)
i-i*(-3) -0,19
(0,93)
0,06
(0,74)
0.10
(0.93)
-0.01
(-0.16)
i-i*(-4) 0,12
(0,71)
-0,08
(-1,29)
-0.18
(-1.97)
-0.10
(-1.37)
Constant 0,05
(0,71)
0,08
(2,5)
0.08
(1.92)
-0.05
(-1.59)
Nobs 229 221
Adj-R2 0,26 0,59 0.35 0.61
Granger causal. 0,66 1,02 5.93 (*) 0.23
Schwartz BIC -1,32 -2.84
Periods are 1896:11 to 1896:3 and 1896:3 to 1914:8.
 (*) significant at 5%
T statistics in parenthesis  the coefficients of the lagged values of the other variable are bold faced. Time units are
monthly observations.
Conclusion
The modern theory of target zones, as re-discovered by Svensson, Krugman, and even Keynes,
was actually first developed before WW I by forgotten Habsburg policy makers such as Governor
Bilinski, as recognized and stressed by contemporary financiers such as Walther Federn. As is well
known, fin-de-siècle Vienna was a hotbed of creativity in areas ranging from psychoanalysis (Freud)
to philosophy (Wittgenstein) to Art Nouveau (Klimt) to economics (Menger, Böhm-Bawerk). In
many respects, the twentieth century was born in this unlikely place in Central Europe. Much less
well known, or perhaps even long forgotten, is the fact that creative genius was also at work in
inventing and practicing the modern target zone theory so that it became the backbone of the
monetary management practices of the Austro-Hungarian bank. This is a case in which practice
preceded theory.
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This Austro-Hungarian success story, in stark contrast to the utter failure of modern experiments,
does hold a lesson for today: while letting the Austro-Hungarian currency fluctuate within a fairly
narrow margin of less than 1%, Habsburg monetary authorities were, indeed, able to achieve their
objective of minimizing the frequency of interest-rate changes, and especially to avoid reacting to
foreign crises. In effect, they changed their discount rate 3 times less frequently than their German
counterpart, in spite of the tight financial links that connected Berlin and Vienna.
At a general level, the device rested, as has been emphasized in the recent literature, on
exchanging interest rate stability for exchange rate flexibility, and on a firm commitment to long-
run exchange rate stability so as to achieve credibility. Yet, as the paper argues, there were more
important features that played a decisive role in the outcome. The first was foreign exchange market
efficiency. We found that a central aspect of the Austro-Hungarian record was the dramatic increase
in efficiency after the currency was stabilized within its band: after the turn of the century, the
forward premium became an unbiased predictor of future exchange rate changes. And this implied
that the market expected the florin to appreciate when it was weak and to depreciate when it was
strong. That efficiency developed along with the implementation of the currency band is an
important finding. It implies that the exchange rate regime does not only influence the behavior of
policy makers, but also the very quality of expectations. Not only policies, but market expectations
as well, change when one moves to a target zone. The existence of this microeconomic channel, in
turn, implies that the advantages traditionally associated with floating exchange rates such as the
ability to have an autonomous monetary policy are perhaps best secured in a currency band: by
fostering market efficiency, a currency band may help policy makers to make full use of the market
mechanism, a channel which we do not think the modern literature has ever recognized.29
Second, our study of covered interest parity has demonstrated that the traditional way through
which recent authors have tested, following Svensson, the target zone model (i.e. by running
regressions of interest rate differentials on exchange rate deviation from parity and checking
whether the estimated coefficient is negative) is not appropriate. Covered interest arbitrage involve
costs, which albeit small, prove considerable over the short run horizon which is precisely the
horizon for which a TZ can provide some autonomy: the logic of Tobin tax conceals the relation
between exchange rate deviation from parity and interest differentials behind a cloud of arbitrage
costs: but it does not destroy it  much to the contrary. Using Granger causality tests, we
demonstrated that the transition to the florin band after 1896 introduced a dynamic, one way, link
going from interest rate differentials to the forward premium. Thus when money rates rose in Berlin,
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Vienna could avoid to respond in kind. Instead, Austro-Hungarian authorities could let the exchange
rate depreciate, trusting that before long markets would bid the florin up.
Finally, it should be noted that the florin target zone did not have pre-specified bounds, but only
informal ones which the market could only infer. While the best economic minds of the time, such
as von Mises, failed to fully comprehend the relevance of this system and advocated, to no avail,
stricter «rules» to foster credibility (Mises [1909]), other authors such as Federn understood the
advantage of not tying the fate of the currency to pre-specified intervention levels: formal
convertibility would have committed monetary authorities to throw their entire reserves in an
exchange rate battle at the gold point, should a confidence crises arise, hereby creating scope for one
sided bets. Letting the exchange rate depreciate beyond the gold points and eventually using foreign
exchange reserves to prevent further departure from parity enabled authorities to circumvent this
problem. Clearly, the implication is that a successful target zone relies on the defense of the long
run target - not on formal bands. It would take the 1992 and 1993 ERM crises for modern policy
makers to relearn this simple lesson, that it is the parity, not the boundary, that matters. Keynes is
often alleged to have said, that every policy maker is the victim of a dead economist. At the end of
this paper, one is left wondering why it takes so long to economist to digest the heritage of deceased
policymakers.
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Data appendix.
Our exchange rate data were collected from the Wiener Börsekammer Coursblätter, in the
archive of the Wiener Börse A.G., Strauchgasse 1-3, A-1014 Vienna, Austria. Schneider et a. [1990]
and Schneider et al. [1993] have spot, but not forward rates. Forward rates were also published in
the Wiener Zeitung as well as in the Neue Freie Presse. A comparison among the three sources
indicated only marginal deviations. The Coursblatter is more systematic in that it gives a series of
quotes, day high, day low, mid day, closing. Closing quotes were the most comprehensive and were
thus the ones we collected. Spot (per cassa) exchange rates with Germany are reported from January
1870 until the Summer of 1914 in all three sources. Until February 1873, though, they are reported
in florins per 100 marks bancos, the Hamburg unit (Hamburg was Germanys prominent foreign
exchange market until Germanys monetary unification which shifted business to Berlin). Rates
switched to German marks in February 1873 with the advent of the new German currency. In order
to obtain a homogeneous series in florins per marks, we divided the quotes in Mark Banco by 1,5.
The sources report both « Geld » and « Waare » rates. « Geld » prices were the bid price, the price at
which people were willing to buy foreign exchange and offering local money. « Waare » was the
price at which people were offering to sell the "goods" (in this case Marks). Forward rates are
available from November 1876 until June 1889 under the heading Liquidations Course, but no
distinction was made between bid and ask rates. From July 1889 onwards, the forward rates were
quoted as «Ultimo», and the distinction between bid and ask rates appeared. Moreover, from
January 1900 quotes are given in Crowns per 100 mark and the quotes were divided by 2 in order a
homogeneous series.
Given that forward rates are quoted for the end of the month (liquidation date) the best date to
collect the figures is the first day of the month after the previous liquidation. When this was a bank
holiday, we collected the next available quote. Three observations need special mention:
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• Spot quotes were not reported for 2.10.1871, and we used the rate for 3.10.1871.
• 2.2.1911, the value for the spot rate: 117.800 is clearly a typographical error (because bid
price exceeded the ask price) and we used instead 117.300, as the obvious value. We would
have gotten the same results if we had used midday values.
• For 01.04.1913 we use midday values for both spot and forward rates, because end-of-day
value is unavailable for forward rate.
We then constructed two series. A series of average bid/ask rates ({Geld(t)+Waare(t)]/2,
1876 :11-1914 :7) and a series of bid rates (1889 :7-1914 :7). The database (available from the
authors upon request) consists of florin/mark exchange rates (number of florins for 100 marks) and
spans the period 1870:1-1914:7 (spot rates) and 1876:11-1914:7 (forward rates). German interest
rates were collected from The Economist, Der deutsche Ökonomist, and the Frankfurter Zeitung.
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Endnotes
                                                
1 According to Keynes the leeway for monetary policy was a function of the spread between the
gold points: the degree of separation between the gold points is a vital factor in the problem of
managing a countrys currency and ought to be the subject of a very careful decision I believe that
there is room here for a reform of real importance [] This would permit temporarily the
maintenance of materially different short money rates in the two centres.. For a reprint of Keynes
analysis along with a discussion of its relevance to the target-zone literature see Eichengreen and
Flandreau [1997].
2 For the political economy of this question, see Michel (1976) and Flandreau (1999).
3 There was a debate on the exact form of foreign exchange interventions. Von Mises insisted that
all interventions were on the spot market. But Federn, with whom Einzig sides, claimed that these
were complemented by forward interventions. However, our perusal of board minutes did not find
references to forward interventions. Archive of the Austrian National Bank, Vienna, Austria.
Protokoll No. 3612/15, October 24, 1907; 3849/15, November 9, 1907; 4207/15, November 28,
1907.
4 On the connections between Federn and the banks establishment, see Einzig [1937].
5 Walther Federn (unsigned), Die Zeit, 23 August 1907, reiterated in numerous editorials in Der
oesterreichische Volkswirt, i.e., July 17, 1909. For a complete list of dates see Einzig, 335; see also,
Federn, (1910b, 666). In the 1910 article Federn referred explicitly to the need to cover exchange-
rate risk by selling forward marks.
6 For contemporary evidence that the bank changed the discount rate much less frequently than
Berlin and London, see von Mises (1909b, 1010).
7 Determining the extent to which Keynes was directly inspired by the Austro-Hungarian precedent
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should be of interest to the historians of economic thought, but is outside of the purview of this
study. We do not find an explicit reference to the Austro-Hungarian case in Keynes, who discusses
the French experiment with « gold devices ». But it is probable that he knew very well of the
policies developed and practiced in Vienna at the turn of the century. Keynes was a City expert as
much as an economist, and the close connections between Viennese and London institutions before
and after WW I were reinforced by the exodus of numerous Austrian financiers to London in the
inter-war period. Moreover, the Austrian discussions on this issue had reached the British public
very early on, through von Misess publication in the Economic Journal (Von Mises [1909a]), an
article with which Keynes would no doubt have been familiar. In other words, there were too many
similarities between Keynes proposal pertaining to target zones, and the Habsburg experiment to
have been merely coincidental: according to Einzig: «There is, however, no reason to believe that
the devices which were applied successfully on a small scale in Vienna could not be applied with
equally successful results in London or other centers on a much larger scale » (Einzig, 1937, p. 339).
8 In Vienna, as in other European markets, there was thus also a forward market in general
securities. These forward transactions were to be settled  liquidated  mostly at the end of the
month, named after the French word «liquidation». As emphasized by Haupt [1894], international
arbitrage in securities was a routine operation in late-nineteenth-century Europe. It rested on a
borrowing on a given security in a market (say Berlin) where the corresponding rate (known as
«report») was high low and lending on a market (say Vienna) where the rate was high. Doing so,
however, involved an element of risk due to the possibility of exchange fluctuations. Obviously, the
only way to be covered against these fluctuations was to have a forward exchange market that would
clear at the same dates as the markets for forward securities, and thus enable one to perform a «true»
(i.e. risk free) arbitrage. It is thus not surprising to find that, along with the «ultimo» quotes for
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general securities there were also in Vienna «ultimo» quotes for German marks and Russian rubles,
in addition to the «spot» (or «per cassa») rates. Interestingly, this provides a rationale for the
development of the forward markets that points to the combined influence of floating exchange
rates and international financial arbitrage.
9 However, it is noteworthy that the official quotation of forward mark rates in Vienna began in
1876, precisely in a year of especially large exchange rate volatility (Flandreau and Komlos, 2001).
There were forward markets in Vienna in other major currencies, but these were small and were not
quoted in the official publications. (An exception was the 20 French Franc gold piece and the rubel
which were quoted forward.) (Federn, 1910a, 164). The forward market in rubels first came into
being in Breslau and Königsberg and subsequently in Berlin (Schulze-Gävernitz, 1899, 503-4), and
futures in rubels were also traded in Vienna (Knapp, 1905, 252).
10 The one exception being Koppl and Yeager [1996] who focus on inefficiencies in the ruble/mark
forward market and argue that these can be attributed to interventions by the Russian government.
11 This relation can alternatively be tested in levels. Results are virtually the same. The main
advantage of working with logs at this stage is that it prepares the ground for the regressions in the
next section which rely on rates of change and thus require working with logs.
12 As explained in the appendix, we have two series for both the spot and forward rates. The average
"bid-ask" series spans 1876:11 to 1914:6. The alternative bid series spans 1889:7 to 1914:6. This is
the case because before 1889:7 we only have the average forward rate  so we can only use the
average spot rate as well. Since taking into account the average bid-ask spread introduces some
additional (albeit marginal) noise in the series, there are reasons to prefer the Geld series which on
the other hand is shorter. When they overlap they yield virtually identical results.
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13 Yeager [1968]. Since it is difficult to point to a specific month we conveniently decided to use as
a break point August of 1889 as it coincided with the beginning of the bid forward series.
14 The new parity was leaked to the market between April 18 and 23rd, see Flandreau and Komlos
[2001]. It was not until 1893, however, that the law was formally ratified by the Austrian and
Hungarian parliaments.
15 Since the band was informal, there was no announcement made. However, very much in the same
way government officials had leaked the new parity, it is probable that an informal announcement
was made. Contemporaries refer to a policy that would have began in early 1896. Our data shows
that the exchange rate reentered the +/-0,4% band in April, and this motivates our choice.
16 As can be seen, in some cases one cannot reject the null of market efficiency. But this is due to
the low significance level of parameters: while H0: β=1 cannot be rejected, one cannot reject H0:
β=0 either.
17 . This is also in contrast to findings reported in the recent literature for more recent experiments
(MacDonald 1988, de Grauwe 1989).
18 Estimates were made also by dividing the period 1901-1914 into sub periods. This did not
introduce any changes in the estimates of ß. Obviously, once established, market efficiency was
maintained unchanged until the outbreak of World War I.
19 This is quite intriguing in view of the modern consensus against the efficiency hypothesis, and
particularly so since according to Federn (1911, 1388) the Austro-Hungarian Bank began a policy of
intervening in the forward market at least by the financial crisis of 1907. This runs quite counter to
the popular view that one possible source of market inefficiency might be government intervention
on the forward market (Fama [1984], De Grauwe, [1998]).
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20 Note: both f and s are in logarithms. We multiply by 12 to obtain annualized rates and by 100 to
obtain percentage.
21 The inter-bank interest rate, known in The Economist as the open market rate, was the rate for
loans of up to three months. In the normal course of its business a bank would typically hold a
portfolio of bills of various qualities. On the one hand the bank would hold prime bills that would
have been endorsed by several top institutions and would thus offer very high security, since every
signature amounted to a legal pledge to pay the bill, should the previous endorser default on it. On
the other hand there would be investment bills that the banker would have obtained by granting
credit to a customer. These bills would be typically riskier and would carry higher interest rates.
Should the bank need cash, it could typically get it through outright sales  at the market rate - of
prime bills to other bankers. Alternatively, the bank could operate through repurchase agreements,
getting credit at the market rate against a temporary transfer of a mixed portfolio of bills, with the
lender taking a cut to protect himself against possible losses resulting from default (see Haupt
[1894]). The open market rate was thus the rate at which one could lend money at a risk that was
close to zero, as well as the cheapest way to get short term credit. It represents, at a given date, the
best measure of the situation of the money market in a given center and will consistently receive
close attention. We collected Austro-Hungarian rates from the Vienna stock exchange returns.
German ones were taken from The Economist (see appendix).
22 The official Bank rates also applied for less than three month credit. These were the rates at which
central banks rediscounted bills. Central banks typically limited the scope of their operations to bills
that had at least two or three signatures, thus shutting out the riskiest assets. On the other hand the
rate they applied was unattractive for the very finest bills, which could be sold at better terms on the
open market. Moreover, once in the portfolio of the Bank, the bills were kept until maturity with the
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Bank taking care of cashing them. (Because cashing bills was costly and cumbersome, some bank-
notes turned the bank a few days before maturity, in fact as soon as the loss incurred by
rediscounting the bill outweighed the costs of cashing it.) In other words, unlike the open market
rate, the Bank rate was only a lending rate: nobody could lend at zero risk at the bank rate. This is
why the Bank rate is a poorer measure of the market situation than the market rate was. Of course
the way the official rate was set had an indirect influence on market rates, since the Bank would
provide last resort rediscounting facilities. And in view of the monetary authorities primary concern
with securing policy autonomy, the Bank rate remains a useful indicator which is worth examining.
(Bank rates for both Austria-Hungary and Germany are available from the Vienna stock exchange
returns (see data appendix).) Moreover a number of international deposits were made at conditions
that were directly related to the bank rate (Flandreau and Gallice [2001]): thus the official rate
influenced the profitability of foreign balances and could thus directly impact international flows of
money. This is why we shall consider both measures in turn.
23 Einzigs graphical covered interest parity tests for the interwar years also consider the rate on
reports. These rates were quoted at the beginning of the month for money to be borrowed until the
next « liquidation » (see above). They thus exactly matched the time period covered by a forward
exchange rate contract subscribed at the beginning of the month and from that point of view should
be the ideal rates to work with. At the same time, these rates, in a given market and date, were
specific to each security involved. In practice, this complex market microstructure was sustained by
transaction costs that prevented full arbitrage between those security specific rates (see Flandreau et
Sicsic [2000] for a discussion of the French case). The only way to go to derive a market rate for
reports (in the absence of an existing portfolio index as the one uncovered for France by Flandreau
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and Sicsic) would be to work out the average rate for a portfolio of securities. But it is not clear
how this portfolio should be defined and we decided not to leave reports out. (see Einzig [1937]).
24 « The practice of interest arbitrage had been highly developed in Vienna for decades before the
war. To some extent foreign centres regularly utilized the facilities of the Vienna money market for
short term investments. The Vienna banks themselves were past masters in such transactions. They
employed their liquid resources abroad whenever this was profitable, and they were usually able to
borrow abroad and emply the funds in Vienna whenever such operations showed a margin of
profit » (Einzig, p. 332)
25 This point posed practical men of finance against such theoreticians as von Mises, who argued
that the existence of a forward premium did not prevent arbitrageurs to put their money where the
higher interest rates prevailed (1909b). While von Mises did not consider exchange-rate risk,
obviously practical men, such as Federn, did.
26 On the borrowing end of the arbitrage, bankers seek to get the lowest rate, and this is the market
rate. And on the lending end, it is obvious that no banker has access to zero risk lending at the
central bank official rate.
27 All values except column 3 are lower than critical value at 5%. We can accept the null hypothesis
that lagged variables are jointly insignificant. The only Granger causality value larger than this is the
one obtained for column 3 in Tables 4a and 4b.
28 In column 4 none of the estimated coefficients of  the lagged values of the other variable (bold
faced) are significant. In contrast, in column 3 the majority of coefficients are non significant. This
is very powerful evidence that the interest differentials were driving the forward premium.
29 This conclusion is in line with the recent « fear of floating » literature according to which country
may prefer to peg when they realize that floating does not provide them with the flexibility they
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need. Bordo and Flandreau  [2001] show with a large sample of countries that the stabilization of
currencies on gold standard currency bands was strongly associated with an increase in financial
depth, which can be interpreted as a proxy for financial development  and market efficiency.
